Propaganda, Alternative Media, and Accountability in Fragile Democracies by Li, Anqi et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
11
83
6v
3 
 [e
co
n.G
N]
  2
8 O
ct 
20
19
Propaganda, Conspiracy Theories, and
Accountability in Fragile Democracies1
Anqi Li2, Davin Raiha3, and Kenneth W. Shotts4
October 2019
1We thank Carlo Horz, Floyd Zhang, and audiences at the 2019 Comparative Politics and
Formal Theory conference at UC Berkeley for helpful comments on this paper.
2Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis. anqili@wustl.edu.
3Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. draiha@iu.edu.
4Stanford Graduate School of Business. kshotts@stanford.edu.
Abstract
We develop a model of electoral accountability in the presence of mainstream and alterna-
tive media outlets. In addition to standard high and low competence types, the incumbent
may be an aspiring autocrat, who controls the mainstream media and will cause substantial
harm if not removed from office. Alternative media can help voters identify and remove
aspiring autocrats and can enable voters to focus on honest mainstream media assessments
of incumbents’ competence. But malicious alternative media that peddle false conspiracy
theories about the incumbent and the mainstream media can induce voters to mistakenly
remove nonautocratic incumbents, which in turn demotivates incumbent effort and under-
mines accountability. The alternative media is most beneficial when it is honest and known
to be honest. It is most dangerous when it is sufficiently credible that voters pay attention
to it, but sufficiently likely to be malicious that it undermines accountability.
Many countries inhabit a grey area between democracy and autocracy—their leaders are
elected, but may act to eliminate institutional checks on their power. One check that aspiring
autocrats seek to remove is the media, which can be induced, by a combination of censorship,
ownership, and corruption, to refrain from criticism and act as a propaganda vehicle. Recent
examples of rulers who have taken this approach include Turkey’s Erdog˘an, Hungary’s Orban,
Venezuela’s Cha´vez and Maduro, and Peru’s Fujimori.
Citizens who are unsure about their leaders’ intentions and the mainstream media’s inde-
pendence may turn to alternative media: opposition television and newspapers, the internet
and social media, or foreign news providers. However, alternative media may themselves be
untrustworthy, seeking to undermine a legitimate ruler by maliciously spreading fake news
or false theories about conspiracies between the incumbent and the mainstream media.
We develop a model of electoral selection and accountability in which citizens are un-
certain about the incumbent’s type, the independence of the mainstream media, and the
reliability of the alternative media. Citizens want to re-elect competent leaders, but when
the mainstream media praises the incumbent they don’t know whether this is neutral praise
of a skillful policymaker or propaganda for an aspiring autocrat. Voters can use alternative
media sources to identify and remove autocratic types, but they also sometimes mistakenly
remove incumbents who are falsely accused. The alternative media also undermines trust in
the mainstream media.
More subtly, the alternative media affects accountability, by altering whether voters use
information from the mainstream media to decide whether to re-elect the incumbent. This
in turn can undermine incumbents’ incentives to demonstrate competence by exerting effort
on policymaking. In other circumstances, the alternative media can improve incumbents’
incentives, by allowing voters to focus on their competence.
A key parameter in our analysis is the reliability of the alternative media. If it is unlikely
to publish false accusations, its main effect is to help citizens remove aspiring autocrats.
In contrast, an alternative media that is known to be malicious is ignored by citizens, who
expect it to cry wolf about legitimate leaders. The worst case arises when the alternative
media is sufficiently reliable that voters pay attention to its claims, yet sufficiently unreliable
that its false accusations disrupt the process of accountability; when this happens, incumbent
incentives are undermined and voters lose the ability to select competent leaders.
Our theory sits at the intersection of the literatures on media bias, electoral accountabil-
ity, and fragile democracies. The media’s role in accountability has been examined by many
scholars, including several who analyze forms of pro- or anti-incumbent bias (Besley and
Prat 2006, Ashworth and Shotts 2010, Warren 2012, Wolton 2019). In those models, voters
know the media’s bias, whereas a key feature of our model is that voters are uncertain about
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whether the mainstream media is captured and whether the alternative media is reliable.1
Research on autocracies and fragile democracies includes empirical analyses of government-
controlled media (for a review, see Enikolopov and Petrova 2015) as well as theories of pro-
paganda and censorship (e.g., Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin 2009; Gehlbach and Sonin 2014;
Lorentzen 2014; Cheah 2016; Gehlbach, Sonin, and Svolik 2016; Little 2017; Horz 2018).
Very few models analyze accountability in weak democracies (though see Svolik 2013).
Our focus is closest to Guriev and Treisman’s (2018) model of propaganda and censorship
by a regime that wishes to appear competent. However, citizens in their model are only
concerned about whether the ruler is competent, not whether she will subvert democracy
and move towards autocracy. Another difference is that criticism of the incumbent in their
model is always accurate, whereas a key parameter in our analysis is the reliability of the
alternative media.
Model
Consider a model of policymaking and elections, with five actors: an incumbent policymaker,
replacement policymaker, mainstream media, alternative media, and voter. There are two
equally-likely states of the world, ω ∈ {0, 1}. The incumbent may learn ω and chooses a
policy x ∈ {0, 1}. Then the mainstream media announces a message m ∈ {0, 1} about
the policy it believes is correct. The alternative media simultaneously issues a report r ∈
{C,NC} about whether the mainstream media is engaged in a conspiracy with an incumbent
who is an aspiring autocrat. Finally, the voter observes x, m, and r but not the true state
ω, and decides between the incumbent and replacement.
The incumbent can be a high, low, or autocratic type, θI ∈ {H,L,A} . High and low com-
petence types are standard in the accountability literature. The autocratic type is novel–she
controls the mainstream media and if she is re-elected she will consolidate her power and
deliver a negative expected payoff to voters. The incumbent is autocratic with probability
α. Conditional on not being autocratic, she is a high type with probability pi. Low and auto-
cratic types only know the prior Pr (ω = 1) = 1
2
and cannot acquire additional information.2
Type H can exert effort, at cost k, to learn the state of the world before choosing policy.
Politicians get an ego-rent of 1 if they win the election.
The mainstream media is either truthful or propagandist. If truthful, it non-strategically
issues a report m ∈ {0, 1} that matches the true state ω with probability q ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
. The
1Outside of the accountability literature, advice from experts with uncertain biases has been examined
in models of electoral competition (Chan and Suen 2009) and policy advice (Minozzi 2011). Whistleblowing
about wrongdoing has been examined in many settings (Chassang and Padro´ i Miquel 2019), including
models tailored to bureaucracies (Ting 2008) and judicial hierarchies (Beim, Hirsch, and Kastellec 2014).
2Even if the autocratic type could exert high effort at a cost, she would have no incentive to do so because
she is always praised by the propagandist mainstream media.
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mainstream media is a propagandist if and only if the incumbent is autocratic, in which case
it always reports that that the incumbent’s policy choice was correct, m = x.
The alternative media is either truthful or malicious. If truthful, it non-strategically
reports r = C, i.e., that the incumbent is autocratic and there is conspiracy, if and only
if this is indeed the case. A malicious alternative media always reports r = C. A central
parameter in our analysis is the probability that the alternative media is malicious, φ ∈ [0, 1].
After observing x, m and r, the voter elects the incumbent or replacement. The voter
gets utility 1 (in an unmodeled second period) from re-electing a high-type incumbent, 0
from a low type, and −a from an autocratic type.3 As is standard in accountability models,
the replacement doesn’t take any actions unless elected. We set UR ∈ [−a, 1] as the voter’s
exogenous expected utility from the replacement.
We characterize Perfect Bayesian equilibria that are symmetric with respect to policies
0 and 1. Symmetry implies that low and autocratic incumbents choose each policy with
probability 1
2
. Other components of an equilibrium are: (1) the high-type incumbent’s effort
decision and policy choice, and (2) the voter’s belief about the incumbent, as well as his
election decision. For technical simplicity, we assume that a high-type incumbent who is
indifferent exerts effort and a voter who is indifferent removes the incumbent.
Baseline
To establish a baseline, suppose there is no alternative media. We say there is accountability
if two conditions hold: (1) high-type incumbents exert effort to choose policy in the voter’s
interest and (2) the incumbent is removed from office if m 6= x. We characterize equilibria
with accountability wherever it is possible, as well as what happens when accountability is
impossible. Note that the two conditions for accountability are mutually reinforcing: a high
type exerts effort to choose good policies and earn praise from the mainstream media, and
the fact that she exerts effort means the media message m is informative about her type.
Voter inferences are complicated by the possibility that the incumbent is autocratic and
the media is propagandist. If the incumbent is very likely to be autocratic, the media message
is meaningless. But if the autocratic type isn’t too likely or too harmful, the possibility of
propaganda doesn’t overwhelm the positive information conveyed by the report m = x. If
high-type incumbents choose x = ω and low and autocratic types choose each policy with
probability 1
2
, the voter’s expected utility from re-electing the incumbent is:
3A possible objection is that some autocrats turn out to be effective policymakers who are well-liked by
their subjects. In our model, −a represents voters’ expected payoff when an autocrat remains in office. This
can include autocrats who turn out to be “good” along with those who turn out to be disastrous, as long as
the expected payoff is negative.
3
U := 1 · Pr (θI = H|m = x)− a · Pr (θI = A|m = x) =
piq − al
piq + (1− pi) 1
2
+ l
,
where l := α
1−α
is the likelihood that the incumbent is autocratic. On the other hand, when
m 6= x the voter knows the incumbent is nonautocratic, so his utility from re-electing her is
his belief about her being type H :
U := 1 · Pr (θI = H|m 6= x) =
pi (1− q)
pi (1− q) + (1− pi) 1
2
.
If the incumbent and replacement are similarly appealing ex ante, i.e., UR ∈ [U, U), the
voter bases his decision on the mainstream media message. Accountability also requires that
the high-type incumbent exert effort. If she doesn’t exert effort, then m = x with probability
1
2
, but with effort this probability increases to q. Thus the effort cost must be less than q− 1
2
.
In what follows, we focus on parameters such that it is possible to have accountability for
some values of UR.
Assumption 1. k ≤ q − 1
2
, and α and a are sufficiently small that U < U .
The following result summarizes the baseline.
Proposition 1. With only the mainstream media.
1. If UR ∈ [U, U), accountability is possible. High type incumbents exert effort to choose
x = ω and the voter re-elects the incumbent iff m = x.
2. Otherwise accountability is impossible and the voter re-elects the incumbent iff she is
ex ante better than the replacement, i.e., (1− α)pi − aα > UR.
Alternative Media
We now analyze the full model, in which the alternative media reports on whether the
incumbent is an aspiring autocrat. To assess the effects of the alternative media, we ask two
questions. First, how does it affect the incumbent’s policymaking effort? Second, how does
it affect electoral selection, both in the sense of re-electing high-type incumbents and in the
sense of removing autocratic ones? We provide intuitive answers to these questions and then
state equilibria in Proposition 2.
Accountability The probability φ that the alternative media is malicious plays a key role
in determining whether accountability is possible. To see this, we begin with situations with
accountability in the baseline model, i.e., UR ∈ [U, U) from Proposition 1.
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If φ = 0, the alternative media perfectly reveals whether the incumbent is autocratic,
and there is an accountability equilibrium in which re-election requires not only m = x but
also r = NC, i.e., the alternative media doesn’t allege a conspiracy. In contrast, if φ = 1, the
alternative media always reports r = C, alleging a conspiracy, so there is an accountability
equilibrium in which the alternative media is ignored and re-election is based solely on the
mainstream media’s message, as in the baseline model.
For intermediate values, φ ∈ (0, 1), the alternative media’s effect is twofold. The first
effect concerns the high-type incumbent’s effort. If re-election requires m = x and r =
NC, then increases in φ demotivate the incumbent, because effort is only rewarded if the
alternative media is truthful. To induce effort requires k ≤
(
q − 1
2
)
(1− φ) or, equivalently,
φ ≤ φe := 1−
k
q − 1
2
.
The second effect concerns whether the voter uses information from the alternative media.
The voter removes the incumbent upon hearing m = x and r = C if
UR ≥ Uv :=
piqφ− al
piqφ+ (1− pi) 1
2
φ+ l
.
This requires that the alternative media be sufficiently reliable,
φ ≤ φv :=
(a + UR) l
piq (1− UR)− (1− pi)
1
2
UR
.
Otherwise the voter ignores the alternative media.
Combining these effects, we see how φ affects accountability. If φv ≤ φe, then if there is
accountability in the baseline, there is also accountability with an alternative media (Propo-
sition 2.2(a)). The voter attends to the alternative media if φ ≤ φv and ignores it otherwise.
Things are more interesting if φv > φe (Proposition 2.2(b)). If φ ≤ φe or φ > φv, there is
accountability and the voter attends to the alternative media in the first case and ignores it
in the second case. But for intermediate values φ ∈ (φe, φv], accountability is impossible.
Under what circumstances does the presence of the alternative media disrupt account-
ability? First, the replacement must be moderately appealing compared to the incumbent,
UR ∈ [U, U). Second, the alternative media must be sufficiently trustworthy that the voter
attends to it (φ ≤ φv) but sufficiently untrustworthy that the incumbent’s fear of being
falsely criticized demotivates her effort (φ > φe). A necessary condition is φe < φv or, equiv-
alently k >
(
q − 1
2
)
(1− φv) . Thus, disruption of accountability due to the presence of an
alternative media occurs when policymaking is difficult, in the sense that it is costly for the
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incumbent to learn the correct policy that serves the voter’s interest.
In other situations, the alternative media can have positive effects on accountability. In
the baseline model, when the replacement is highly appealing (UR ≥ U), accountability is
impossible and the voter removes the incumbent even when m = x. The alternative media
reveals additional information, because r = NC means the incumbent is nonautocratic.
If the high-type incumbent exerts effort, the voter’s expected utility from re-electing the
incumbent after m = x and r = NC is:
U := Pr (θI = H|m = x and r = NC) =
piq
piq + (1− pi) 1
2
> U.
As is shown in Proposition 2.3, the presence of the alternative media makes accountability
possible when the replacement is reasonably highly-appealing and false criticism is not so
likely as to demotivate effort, i.e., UR ∈ [U, U) and φ ≤ φe.
Selection We analyze how the probability φ that the alternative media is malicious affects
selection, starting with cases where the replacement is moderately appealing: UR ∈ [U, U)
from Proposition 1.
The effect is straightforward if φv ≤ φe. For φ ≤ φv, there is accountability and the voter
listens to both media outlets. Increasing φ worsens selection, as nonautocratic incumbents
are more frequently falsely accused and removed from office. For φ > φv, there is account-
ability but the alternative media is ignored, so local changes in φ don’t affect selection.
Things are more dramatic if φv > φe, because changes in φ can affect the incumbent’s
effort. At φ = φe, the equilibrium transitions from one with accountability to one without
accountability. Thus as φ crosses the threshold of φe, the voter completely loses the benefit
of selecting based on the mainstream media message. However, as the alternative media
becomes more unreliable and φ increases above φv, accountability is restored, and the voter
is able to benefit from selecting based solely on the mainstream media message.
We also note how φ affects selection based on the mainstream media report when UR /∈
[U, U). With an unappealing replacement (UR < U), there is no accountability and the voter
never selects based on the mainstream media message. With a highly-appealing replacement
(UR ∈ [U, U)), there is accountability if the alternative media is not demotivating, i.e.,
φ ≤ φe, in which case the voter uses information from both media outlets.
Finally, we note that absent accountability, the voter benefits from selecting based on
the alternative media report if two conditions hold. First, the alternative media must be
sufficiently trustworthy for the voter to remove the incumbent when r = C. This requires
φ ≤ φs :=
(a + UR) l
pi − UR
or, equivalently, UR ≥ Us :=
piφ− al
φ+ l
.
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Second, the incumbent must be sufficiently likely to be a high type for the voter to re-elect
her when he sees r = NC, learns that she is nonautocratic, and doesn’t learn anything about
her competence. This requires pi > UR or, equivalently, φs > 0.
Voter welfare Our results on accountability and selection establish non-monotonicity of
voter welfare as we vary the probability that the alternative media is malicious. The voter
can be better off with a highly unreliable alternative media, which he ignores, than with a
somewhat reliable one that cannot be ignored but demotivates the incumbent’s policy effort.
Summary The following proposition summarizes equilibria with accountability whenever
it is possible as well as what happens in equilibrium when accountability is impossible.
Proposition 2. With an alternative media.
1. For UR < U , the incumbent never exerts effort and two situations can happen:
(a) if φ ≤ φs, the incumbent is re-elected iff r = NC;
(b) if φ > φs, the incumbent is always re-elected.
2. For UR ∈ [U, U).
(a) If φv ≤ φe, two situations can happen:
i. if φ ≤ φv, the incumbent exerts effort and is re-elected iff m = x and r = NC;
ii. if φ > φv, the incumbent exerts effort and is re-elected iff m = x.
(b) If φv > φe, three situations can happen:
i. if φ ≤ φe, the incumbent exerts effort and is re-elected iff m = x and r = NC;
ii. if φ ∈ (φe, φv], the incumbent exerts no effort, and is either never re-elected
(if φs < 0), always re-elected (if φ > φs > 0), or re-elected iff r = NC (if
φ ≤ φs);
iii. if φ > φv the incumbent exerts effort and is re-elected iff m = x.
3. For UR ∈ [U, U),
(a) if φ ≤ φe, the incumbent exerts effort and is re-elected iff m = x and r = NC;
(b) if φ > φe, the incumbent exerts no effort and two situations can happen:
i. If UR < pi, the incumbent is re-elected iff r = NC;
ii. If UR ≥ pi, the incumbent is never re-elected;
4. For UR ≥ U, the incumbent exerts no effort and is never re-elected.
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Discussion
We conclude by briefly discussing additional implications of our model. It is straightforward
to show that the voter’s belief about the probability that the mainstream media is truthful
decreases when the alternative media accuses it of being a propaganda vehicle for the in-
cumbent. This is consistent with the decline in trust in the media at a time when there is a
proliferation of alternative media sources that disparage the mainstream media.
At a broader level, our model contributes to the growing literature on democratic back-
sliding and autocratization in countries such as Brazil, Ecuador, Hungary, India, Poland,
Russia, Turkey, and Venezuela. Backsliding takes many forms, as aspiring autocrats under-
mine multiple institutions, including elections, opposition parties, the bureaucracy, and the
judiciary. Scholars have identified behind-the-scenes control of the media as one of the most
common forms of backsliding (Bermeo 2016; Mechkova, Lu¨hrmann, and Lindberg 2017),
and evidence on bribes by Peru’s Fujimori shows that he placed an especially high value
on the media (McMillan and Zoido 2004). Alternative media and civic organizations can
sometimes counteract such actions, serving as independent information sources and under-
mining support for autocratic rulers (Knight and Tribin 2019). However, as noted by Bermeo
(2016), they often face a credibility problem because rulers may accuse them of being special
interests, representatives of a discredited old order, or tools of foreign powers.
Another application of our model is to fake news that alleges conspiracies between politi-
cians and the mainstream media. Fake news has been studied by empiricists who analyze
effects on voting and electoral outcomes (e.g., Allcott and Gentzkow 2017). Theoretical anal-
yses include Allcott and Gentzkow’s verbal theory, Yea’s (2018) Bayesian persuasion game,
Taylor’s (2019) model of message substitution, and Bra¨uninger and Marinov’s (2019) model
of conspiracy theories and skepticism, all of which analyze the generation of false claims as
well as effects on citizens’ beliefs and behavior.
Our model suggests that the effect of fake news goes beyond fooling voters into making
errors. Rather, fake news, like other malicious alternative media sources, can undermine
accountability, disincentivize incumbent policymaking effort, and make it impossible for
voters to assess an incumbent based on her policy record. This implication dovetails with
Jee, Lueders, and Myrick’s (2019) argument that fake news and propaganda contribute to
democratic backsliding and “negatively affect[-] citizens’ ability to make informed choices in
elections and to hold their elected representatives accountable.”
Our analysis makes it possible to determine when alternative media will have a negative
effect, when it will have positive effect, and when it will have no effect. The alternative media
is most beneficial when it is honest and known to be honest. In contrast, an alternative media
that is known to be malicious is not much of a problem, because voters ignore it. What is
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most problematic is an alternative media that is sufficiently likely to be honest that voters
pay attention to it, but sufficiently likely to be malicious that it interferes with selection,
undermines incumbent incentives, and destroys accountability.
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Appendix: Proofs
For any parameter values there exists an equilibrium in which the type H incumbent does
not exert effort. We analyze whether it is possible to have an equilibrium with accountability.
In the proofs, we use µH and µA to denote voter beliefs about the probability that the
incumbent is type H or A.
Before we prove the results, three things are worth noting.
First, we have assumed that if the incumbent is autocratic the mainstream media always
reports m = x, i.e., it says that the incumbent chose the correct policy. A natural question
is whether a strategic propagandist who seeks to maximize the incumbent’s probability of
re-election has an incentive to instead report m 6= x. In the equilibria that we characterize,
a strategic propagandist can never help the incumbent by doing this.
Second, although we have assumed symmetry, which directly implies that type L and A
incumbents choose each policy x ∈ {0, 1} with probability 1
2
, Lemma 4 in the Additional
Results section at the end of the appendix shows that our results on the existence of equilibria
with accountability do not depend on this assumption.
Third, we note that our assumption that a type H incumbent who is indifferent about ef-
fort exerts effort and a voter who is indifferent removes the incumbent only affects our analysis
for knife-edge parameter cases, specifically k ∈
{
q − 1
2
,
(
q − 1
2
)
(1− φ)
}
, UR ∈
{
U, U, U, pi
}
,
and φ ∈ {φe, φv, φs} . These are the only parameters for which these actors can be indifferent
when each of them plays pure strategies.
Proof of Proposition 1
Part 1. We first calculate voter beliefs, then turn to voter and incumbent strategies.
Suppose type H exerts effort and chooses x = ω. Recall that the mainstream media
reports m = ω with probability q if the incumbent is type H or L and always reports m = x
if the incumbent is type A.
For voter beliefs when m = x: with probability (1− α)pi the incumbent is type H in
which case m = x with probability q, with probability (1− α) (1− pi) the incumbent is type
L in which case m = x with probability 1
2
, and with probability α the incumbent is type A
in which case m = x always. Thus, using the notation l := α
1−α
, Bayes’ rule implies that
µH(m = x) =
(1− α)piq
(1− α) piq + (1− α) (1− pi) 1
2
+ α
=
piq
piq + (1− pi) 1
2
+ l
,
and µA(m = x) =
α
(1− α)piq + (1− α) (1− pi) 1
2
+ α
=
l
piq + (1− pi) 1
2
+ l
.
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For beliefs when m 6= x: with probability (1− α)pi the incumbent is type H, in which
case m 6= x with probability (1− q); with probability (1− α) (1− pi) the incumbent is type
L, in which case m 6= x with probability 1
2
; and with probability α the incumbent is type A,
in which case the media never reports m 6= x. Thus
µH(m 6= x) =
pi (1− q)
pi (1− q) + (1− pi) 1
2
and µA(m 6= x) = 0.
The voter gets utility 1 from type H , 0 from type L, and −a from type A, so his expected
utility from re-electing when m = x is
1 · µH(m = x)− a · µA(m = x) =
piq − al
piq + (1− pi) 1
2
+ l
= U,
and his expected utility from re-electing when m 6= x is
1 · µH(m 6= x)− a · µA(m 6= x) =
pi (1− q)
pi (1− q) + (1− pi) 1
2
= U.
Thus if the voter’s utility from the replacement is UR ∈ [U, U), he re-elects the incumbent
iff m = x.
For type H , given the voter’s strategy, she is re-elected with probability 1
2
if she doesn’t
exert effort and with probability q if she exerts effort, so she exerts effort if the cost satisfies
k ≤ q − 1
2
.
Part 2. To prove this part of the proposition we first assume accountability and derive a
contradiction. If type H exerts effort and chooses x = ω, then for UR < U the voter always
re-elects the incumbent, so type H will not exert effort. Likewise, if type H exerts effort and
chooses x = ω, then for UR ≥ U the voter always removes the incumbent so type H will not
exert effort.
Given that the incumbent does not exert effort and her choice of x does not reveal any-
thing about her type, the voter’s expected utility from the incumbent is the same regardless
of whether m = x or m 6= x. With probability (1− α)pi she is type H , with probability
(1− α) (1− pi) she is L, and with probability α she is A. So the voter’s expected utility from
the incumbent is
1 · (1− α) pi + 0 · (1− α) (1− pi)− a · α = (1− α)pi − aα,
and the voter re-elects the incumbent iff this is strictly greater than UR.
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To set up the proof of Proposition 2, we develop three lemmas to characterize voter
beliefs, voter best responses, and incumbent best responses.
Lemma 1. Voter beliefs depend on type H’s effort choice as follows.
1. If type H exerts effort, then
(a) µH(m = x, r = NC) = piq
piq+(1−pi) 1
2
and µA(m = x, r = NC) = 0;
(b) µH(m = x, r = C) = piqφ
piqφ+(1−pi) 1
2
φ+l
and µA(m = x, r = C) = l
piqφ+(1−pi) 1
2
φ+l
;
(c) µH(m 6= x, r = NC) = µH(m 6= x, r = C) = pi(1−q)
pi(1−q)+(1−pi) 1
2
; and
µA(m 6= x, r = NC) = µA(m 6= x, r = C) = 0.
2. If type H does not exert effort, then
(a) µH(m = x, r = NC) = µH(m 6= x, r = NC) = pi and
µA(m = x, r = NC) = µA(m 6= x, r = NC) = 0;
(b) µH(m = x, r = C) = µH(m 6= x, r = C) = piφ
φ+l
and
µA(m = x, r = C) = µA(m 6= x, r = C) = l
φ+l
.
Proof. All of the results follow directly from Bayes’ rule. We note a few details for different
parts of the lemma.
1(a). The alternative media reports r = NC only if the voter is not type A. Conditional
on r = NC, with probability pi the incumbent is type H, in which case m = x = ω with
probability q. With probability (1− pi) the incumbent is type L, in which case m = x with
probability 1
2
.
1(b). Recall that the alternative media reports r = C for types H and L with probability
φ (the probability that it is malicious) and it always reports r = C when the incumbent
is type A. So with probability (1− α)piqφ the incumbent is type H and the media reports
are m = x and r = C, with probability (1− α) (1− pi) 1
2
φ the incumbent is type L and the
reports are m = x and r = C, and with probability α the incumbent is type A and the
reports are m = x and r = C. Applying Bayes’ rule and using l = α
1−α
yields the result.
1(c). When m 6= x the voter knows the incumbent is not type A, and straightforwardly
updates on the competence of the incumbent.
2(a). The alternative media announcement r = NC eliminates the possibility that the
incumbent is type A. Because type H does not exert effort, the voter doesn’t update about
the relative likelihood of type H and L based on m.
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2(b). The voter doesn’t update based on m, but does update based on r about the
probability that the incumbent is nonautocratic (in which case r = C with probability φ) or
autocratic (in which case r = C with probability 1).
Lemma 2. The voter’s best responses to type H’s effort choice are as follows.
1. Suppose type H exerts effort.
(a) When m = x and r = NC, the voter reelects the incumbent iff UR < U =
piq
piq+(1−pi) 1
2
.
(b) When m = x and r = C, the voter reelects the incumbent iff UR < Uv =
piqφ−al
piqφ+(1−pi) 1
2
φ+l
or, equivalently, φ > φv =
(a+UR)l
piq(1−UR)−(1−pi)
1
2
UR
.
(c) When m 6= x, regardless of r the voter reelects the incumbent iff UR < U =
pi(1−q)
pi(1−q)+(1−pi) 1
2
.
2. Suppose type H does not exert effort.
(a) When r = NC, regardless of m the voter reelects the incumbent iff UR < pi or,
equivalently, φs =
(a+UR)l
pi−UR
> 0.
(b) When r = C, regardless of m the voter reelects the incumbent iff UR < Us =
piφ−al
φ+l
or, equivalently, φ > φs =
(a+UR)l
pi−UR
.
Proof. The voter gets utility 1 from type H , 0 from type L, and −a from type A, so his
expected utility from re-electing the incumbent is
1 · µH − aµA.
The parts of the lemma follow from the corresponding parts of Lemma 1 and algebra.
Lemma 3. Type H’s best responses to the voter’s reelection rule are as follows.
1. If the voter re-elects the incumbent iff m = x and r = NC, then type H exerts effort
iff k ≤
(
q − 1
2
)
(1− φ) or, equivalently, φ ≤ φe = 1−
k
q− 1
2
.
2. If the voter re-elects the incumbent iff m = x, then type H exerts effort iff k ≤ q − 1
2
.
3. If the voter re-elects the incumbent iff r = NC, then type H does not exert effort.
4. If the voter always re-elects the incumbent or never re-elects the incumbent, then type
H does not exert effort.
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Proof. For Part 1: with effort type H ’s expected utility is q (1− φ)− k, and without effort
it is 1
2
(1− φ), which yields the condition. For Part 2: with effort type H ’s expected utility is
q− k, and without effort it is 1
2
, which yields the condition. For Parts 3 and 4, type H does
not exert effort because effort is costly and does not affect the probability of re-election.
Proof of Proposition 2
For each parameter region, we conjecture that the incumbent behaves accountably in the
following sense: type H exerts effort and chooses x = ω, whereas L and A choose each
x ∈ {0, 1} with probability 1
2
. We then characterize the voter’s best response. If it’s optimal
for type H to exert effort given the voter’s best response, there is an equilibrium with
accountability. Otherwise there isn’t, and we characterize what happens in equilibrium when
all incumbent types choose each policy with probability 1
2
. Note that U, Uv, Us < U < U
and that U, Us < pi < U .
Proposition 2.1 Suppose UR < U and the incumbent behaves accountably. By Lemma
2.1(c), the voter re-elects the incumbent if m 6= x. Thus type H has no incentive to exert
effort, so there cannot be an equilibrium with accountability. Now suppose all incumbent
types choose each policy with probability 1
2
. Because UR < U < pi, Lemma 2.2(a) implies
that when r = NC the incumbent is re-elected. Lemma 2.2(b) shows that when r = C the
voter’s best response depends on whether φ > φs, thus completing the proof of Proposition
2.1.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose UR ∈ [U, U) and the incumbent behaves accountably. The
voter’s best response depends on whether φ > φv. Consider two cases.
Case 1. If φ ≤ φv, then Uv ≤ UR < U , so Lemma 2.1 implies that the incumbent is
reelected iff m = x and r = NC. By Lemma 3.1, it is optimal for type H to exert effort iff
φ ≤ φe, and combining yields the existence of equilibria with accountability as in Proposition
2.2(a)i and 2.2(b)i. On the other hand, if φ ∈ (φe, φv], then Lemma 3.1 implies that it is not
optimal for the incumbent to exert effort given the voter’s best response. Without incumbent
effort, Lemma 2.2 characterizes voter behavior for Proposition 2.2(b)ii.
Case 2. If φ > φv, then UR < Uv < U , so Lemma 2.1 implies that the incumbent is
reelected iff m = x. From Lemma 3.2, it is optimal for type H to exert effort iff k ≤ q − 1
2
,
which holds true under Assumption 1. Combining yields Proposition 2.2(a)ii and 2.2(b)iii.
Proposition 2.3 Suppose UR ∈ [U, U) and the incumbent behaves accountably. Since
U > Uv and hence UR > Uv, Lemma 2.1 implies that the incumbent is reelected iff m = x
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and r = NC. By Lemma 3.1, type H exerts effort iff φ ≤ φe, and combining yields the
condition for existence of an equilibrium with accountability as in Proposition 2.3(a).
Without effort by type H , first note that pi > Us. Consider two cases.
Case 1. If UR ≥ pi, then UR ≥ pi > Us. By Lemma 2, the incumbent is removed regardless
of r as in Proposition 2.3(b)ii.
Case 2. If UR < pi and r = NC, then from Lemma 2.2(a) the incumbent is re-elected.
If UR < pi and r = C then the incumbent is removed. To see this, note that UR ≥ U
by assumption and that U > Us. Combining yields UR > Us, so from Lemma 2.2(b) the
incumbent is removed when r = C. This establishes Proposition 2.3(b)i.
Proposition 2.4 Suppose UR ≥ U and the incumbent behaves accountably. Since U >
max {Uv, U, pi, Us}, Lemma 2 implies that the incumbent is always removed from office re-
gardless of whether she exerts effort and regardless of r and m. By Lemma 3.4, type H exerts
no effort.
Additional Results
We now show that our restriction to equilibria that are symmetric with respect to the
policies does not affect our results on the existence of equilibria with accountability. The
next lemma says that if there exists an equilibrium with accountability in which types L and
A mix with different probabilities than 1
2
, then we can construct another equilibrium with
mixing probability 1
2
:
Lemma 4. Fix model primitives. If there exists an equilibrium in which type H exerts effort
and chooses x = ω, then there exists an equilibrium in which types L and A choose each
x ∈ {0, 1} with probability 1
2
, type H exerts effort and chooses x = ω, and voter strategy is
unchanged compared to the original equilibrium.
The intuition is as follows. Symmetry implies that types A and L choose each policy
with probability 1
2
. If type A or L were to play asymmetrically, e.g., by choosing x = 1
with probability less than 1
2
, this would decrease the voter’s expected utility from re-electing
the incumbent in information sets where x = 0 and increase the voter’s expected utility
from re-electing in information sets where x = 1. If such an asymmetric strategy has any
effect on the voter’s best response (relative to what happens with types A and L playing
symmetrically), it would be to give types A and L an incentive to play x = 1 rather than x = 0
in order to increase their chances of winning re-election, which means that the asymmetric
strategy couldn’t be part of an equilibrium. On the other hand, if the asymmetric strategy
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doesn’t affect the voter’s best response relative to what happens with types A and L playing
symmetrically, then it has no effect on accountability and the incentive of type H .
Proof. Let pL and pA denote the probabilities that types L and A choose x = 1 in the
original equilibrium, respectively. Lemma 4 claims that changing these probabilities to
p˜L = p˜A =
1
2
while holding other players’ strategies fixed yields a new equilibrium. This
requires showing that types L and A are indifferent between x ∈ {0, 1} and thus can mix.
It also requires showing that the voter’s strategy in the original equilibrium remains a best
response after the change, and so the incentives for type H to exert effort and choose x = ω
remain unchanged. The proof proceeds in four steps.
Step 1. Show that in the original equilibrium, the voter must re-elect the incumbent with
the same probability in the following two information sets: m = x = 0, r = C andm = x = 1,
r = C.
Consider a type A incumbent. For her, the voter always observes m = x and r = C.
Thus the above two information sets are the only ones that matter for type A’s incentive.
Suppose, to the contrary, that the voter behaves asymmetrically in these information sets.
This means that either
EUV (reelect|m = x = 0, r = C) ≤ UR < EUV (reelect|m = x = 1, r = C) ,
or
EUV (reelect|m = x = 1, r = C) ≤ UR < EUV (reelect|m = x = 0, r = C) ,
where EUV (reelect | ·) denotes the voter’s expected utility from reelecting the incumbent
in an information set. Consider the former case. In this case, type A is re-elected iff she
chooses x = 1, so her strict best response is pA = 1. Using this, along with the conjectured
pL and type H ’s behavior in the conjectured equilibrium, voter beliefs when x = 0 are
µH(m = x = 0, r = NC) = µH(m = x = 0, r = C) =
piq
piq + (1− pi) (1− pL)
,
µH(m = 1, x = 0, r = NC) = µH(m = 1, x = 0, r = C) =
pi (1− q)
pi (1− q) + (1− pi) (1− pL)
,
and µA(m, x = 0, r) = 0, ∀m, r.
Given these beliefs, the voter never re-elects the incumbent when x = 0. This follows be-
cause UR ≥ EUV (reelect|m = x = 0, r = C) by assumption, and straightforward algebra
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establishes that
EUV (reelect|m = x = 0, r = C) = EUV (reelect|m = x = 0, r = NC)
> EUV (reelect|m = 1, x = 0, r = C) = EUV (reelect|m = 1, x = 0, r = NC) .
Meanwhile, the voter re-elects the incumbent when x = m = 1 and r = C by assumption.
Combining shows that all incumbent types strictly prefer to choose x = 1 rather than to
choose x = 0, so in particular type H does not exert effort, thus reaching a contradiction.
The proof of the latter case is similar and is therefore omitted.
Step 2. Show that if p˜L = p˜A =
1
2
while type H exerts effort and chooses x = ω, then the
voter’s best responses in the two information sets considered in Step 1 (m = x = 0, r = C
and m = x = 1, r = C) are the same as in the original equilibrium.
There are two ways that the voter can behave symmetrically: re-electing the incumbent
in both information sets, or removing her in both information sets. We focus on the former
case, i.e., UR < EUV (reelect|m = x = 0, r = C) , EUV (reelect|m = x = 1, r = C), since the
proof of the latter case is similar.
In the original equilibrium, by Bayes’ rule, voter beliefs in the above information sets are
µH(m = x = 0, r = C) =
piqφ
piqφ+ (1− pi) (1− pL)φ+ 2l (1− pA)
,
µA(m = x = 0, r = C) =
2l (1− pA)
piqφ+ (1− pi) (1− pL)φ+ 2l (1− pA)
,
µH(m = x = 1, r = C) =
piqφ
piqφ+ (1− pi) pLφ+ 2lpA
, and
µA(m = x = 1, r = C) =
2lpA
piqφ+ (1− pi) pLφ+ 2lpA
.
Moreover, we have
EUV (reelect|m = x = 0, r = C) =
piqφ− a2l (1− pA)
piqφ+ (1− pi) (1− pL)φ+ 2l (1− pA)
> UR
and EUV (reelect|m = x = 1, r = C) =
piqφ− a2lpA
piqφ+ (1− pi) pLφ+ 2lpA
> UR
by assumption, and rearranging yields
piqφ (1− UR) > (1− pL)UR (1− pi)φ+ (1− pA) 2l (a + UR) , (1)
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and
piqφ (1− UR) > pLUR (1− pi)φ+ pA2l (a + UR) . (2)
Equations 1 and 2 imply that for any z ∈ [0, 1],
piqφ (1− UR) > z [(1− pL)UR (1− pi)φ+ (1− pA) 2l (a + UR)]
+ (1− z) [pLUR (1− pi)φ+ pA2l (a + UR)] .
In particular, for z = 1
2
,
piqφ (1− UR) >
1
2
UR (1− pi)φ+
1
2
2l (a+ UR) ,
which, using p˜L = p˜A =
1
2
, can be written as
piqφ− a2lp˜A
piqφ+ (1− pi) p˜Lφ+ 2lp˜A
> UR. (3)
Now, notice that after we change pL and pA to p˜L = p˜A =
1
2
while holding type H ’s
strategy fixed, the voter’s expected utilities from reelecting the incumbent, denoted by
E˜UV (reelect | ·), become
E˜UV (reelect | m = x = 1, r = C) = E˜UV (reelect | m = x = 0, r = C)
=
piqφ− a2lp˜A
piqφ+ (1− pi) p˜Lφ+ 2lp˜A
and are strictly greater than UR by Equation 3. Thus in the above information sets, the
voter always reelects the incumbent as in the original equilibrium, thus completing the proof
of Step 2.
From Steps 1 and 2, we conclude that type A is indifferent between x ∈ {0, 1} given the
voter’s best response to p˜L = p˜A =
1
2
and type H exerting effort and choosing x = ω. That
is, type A can mix after the proposed change.
For the rest of the analysis we focus on type L. We begin with three observations:
1. For type L, whether m = x is independent of whether r = C, and neither depends on
her choice of x. Thus when characterizing L’s best responses we can focus exclusively
on whether she is re-elected in the various information sets without worrying about
the probability that each information set is reached.
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2. Because the probabilities of reaching the two information sets m = x = 0, r = C and
m = x = 1, r = C do not depend on x for type L, and Step 2 established that the
voter treats the policies symmetrically in these two information sets (either re-electing
in both or removing the incumbent in both), we can ignore these two information sets
when analyzing type L’s incentives.
3. The remainder of the proof focuses on the other six information sets: m = x =
0, r = NC; m = x = 1, r = NC; m = 1, x = 0, r = NC; m = 0, x = 1, r = NC;
m = 1, x = 0, r = C; and m = 0, x = 1, r = C. Since these information sets are never
reached for a type A incumbent (for whom m = x and r = C always), there the voter
knows that the incumbent is not type A, and his beliefs about the incumbent only
depend on pL, not pA.
With these observations in place, we continue the analysis of type L.
Step 3. Show that in the original equilibrium, the µH ’s in the above six information sets
are ordered, with the voter having a higher opinion of an incumbent who chooses the policy
that is less likely to be chosen by type L.
These beliefs are
µH(m = x = 0, r = NC) =
piq
piq + (1− pi) (1− pL)
,
µH(m = x = 1, r = NC) =
piq
piq + (1− pi) pL
,
µH(m = 1, x = 0, r = NC) = µH(m = 1, x = 0, r = C) =
pi (1− q)
pi (1− q) + (1− pi) (1− pL)
,
and µH(m = 0, x = 1, r = NC) = µH(m = 0, x = 1, r = C) =
pi (1− q)
pi (1− q) + (1− pi) pL
,
and straightforward algebra establishes that
µH(m = x = 0, r = NC) < µH(m = x = 1, r = NC)
⇐⇒ µH(m = 1, x = 0, r = NC) < µH(m = 0, x = 1, r = NC)
⇐⇒ µH(m = 1, x = 0, r = C) < µH(m = 0, x = 1, r = C)
⇐⇒ pL <
1
2
. (4)
Also note that if pL >
1
2
, then the above inequalities are reversed, and if pL =
1
2
then the
above inequalities become equalities. Moreover, because the voter knows the incumbent is
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not type A the above beliefs directly determine his expected utilities from re-electing the
incumbent. That is, EUV (reelect | m, x, r) = µ
H (m, x, r) in the above six information sets.
Step 4. We now complete the proof, analyzing two cases.
Case 1. pL =
1
2
. After changing pL to p˜L =
1
2
, the voter’s best responses remain
unchanged in the above six information sets, and because beliefs are equal in each line of
Equation 4 he treats the policies symmetrically. Combined with Step 2 (which established
that the voter treats the policies symmetrically in the other two information sets where
m = x and r = C), we obtain that type L is indifferent between the policies and thus can
mix after the proposed change. Furthermore, the voter’s strategy in the original equilibrium
remains a best response, and so type H ’s incentives remain unchanged, too. Taken together,
there exists an equilibrium with accountability in which p˜A = p˜L =
1
2
.
Case 2. pL 6=
1
2
. By symmetry, consider the case of pL <
1
2
, in which the voter’s belief
given x = 0 is lower than its counterpart given x = 1 in each line of Equation 4.
We first prove that the voter treats the policies symmetrically. If the contrary were true,
then
UR ∈ [µ
H(m = x = 0, r = NC), µH(m = x = 1, r = NC)), or
UR ∈ [µ
H(m = 1, x = 0, r = NC), µH(m = 0, x = 1, r = NC)), or
UR ∈ [µ
H(m = 1, x = 0, r = C), µH(m = 0, x = 1, r = C)),
implying that the incumbent is re-elected for x = 1 but not for x = 0 in at least one of
the following three types of information sets: m = x and r = NC, m 6= x and r = NC,
or m 6= x and r = C. However pL <
1
2
implies that in the other two information sets, the
voter’s belief is strictly higher when x = 1 than when x = 0, so in those information sets
he must be weakly more likely to re-elect the incumbent when x = 1. Thus type L’s best
response is to choose x = 1 always, which contradicts the assumption that pL <
1
2
.
Thus the voter must treat the policies symmetrically in the original equilibrium, which
requires that
UR /∈ [µ
H(m = x = 0, r = NC), µH(m = x = 1, r = NC)),
UR /∈ [µ
H(m = 1, x = 0, r = NC), µH(m = 0, x = 1, r = NC)), and
UR /∈ [µ
H(m = 1, x = 0, r = C), µH(m = 0, x = 1, r = C)).
The voter continues to treat the policies symmetrically after we replace pL with p˜L =
1
2
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because, using ˜s to denote the new beliefs, Equation 4 implies that the new beliefs are
sandwiched by the old ones:
µH(m = x = 0, r = NC) < µ˜H(m = x = 0, r = NC)
= µ˜H(m = x = 1, r = NC) < µH(m = x = 1, r = NC),
µH(m = 1, x = 0, r = NC) < µ˜H(m = 1, x = 0, r = NC)
= µ˜H(m = 0, x = 1, r = NC) < µH(m = 0, x = 1, r = NC), and
µH(m = 1, x = 0, r = C) < µ˜H(m = 1, x = 0, r = C)
= µ˜H(m = 0, x = 1, r = C) < µH(m = 0, x = 1, r = C).
Combined with Step 2 (which established that the voter treats the policies symmetrically
in the two information sets where m = x and r = C), we obtain that type L is indifferent
between the policies and thus can mix after the proposed change. The remainder of the
proof is the same as in Case 1 and is therefore omitted. 
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